Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions

@inproceedings{Lavi2000CompetitiveAO,
  title={Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions},
  author={Ron Lavi and Noam Nisan},
  booktitle={EC},
  year={2000}
}
This paper studies auctions in a setting where the di erent bidders arrive at di erent times and the auction mechanism is required to make decisions about each bid as it is received. Such settings occur in computerized auctions of computational resources as well as in other settings. We call such auctions, on-line auctions. We rst characterize exactly on-line auctions that are incentive compatible, i.e. where rational bidders are always motivated to bid their true valuation. We then embark on a… CONTINUE READING
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