Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial Algorithm and Hardness

  title={Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial Algorithm and Hardness},
  author={Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury and Jugal Garg and Patricia C. McGlaughlin and Ruta Mehta},
  journal={Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},
  • B. ChaudhuryJ. Garg R. Mehta
  • Published 23 May 2022
  • Economics
  • Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
We study the computational complexity of finding a competitive equilibrium (CE) with chores when agents have linear preferences. CE is one of the most preferred mechanisms for allocating a set of items among agents. CE with equal incomes (CEEI), Fisher, and Arrow-Debreu (exchange) are the fundamental economic models to study allocation problems, where CEEI is a special case of Fisher and Fisher is a special case of exchange. When the items are goods (giv-ing utility), the CE set is convex even… 
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