Competitive Equilibria in Matching Markets with Budgets

  title={Competitive Equilibria in Matching Markets with Budgets},
  author={Ning Chen and Xiaotie Deng and Arpita Ghosh},
  journal={SIGecom Exchanges},
Consider a market with <i>n</i> unit demand buyers and <i>m</i> sellers, each selling one unit of an indivisible good. The buyers specify their preferences over items via utility functions <i>u</i><sub><i>ij</i></sub>(<i>p</i><sub><i>j</i></sub>), which is the utility of buyer <i>i</i> for item <i>j</i> when its price is <i>p</i><sub><i>j</i></sub>. So far, this is the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment model [Shapley and Shubik 1971] which captures a variety of matching markets including… CONTINUE READING