Competitions between prosocial exclusions and punishments in finite populations

  title={Competitions between prosocial exclusions and punishments in finite populations},
  author={Lin jie Liu and Xiaojie Chen and Attila Szolnoki},
  journal={Scientific Reports},
Prosocial punishment has been proved to be a powerful mean to promote cooperation. Recent studies have found that social exclusion, which indeed can be regarded as a kind of punishment, can also support cooperation. However, if prosocial punishment and exclusion are both present, it is still unclear which strategy is more advantageous to curb free-riders. Here we first study the direct competition between different types of punishment and exclusion. We find that pool (peer) exclusion can always… 
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