Competition for Procurement Contracts with Service Guarantees

@article{Bernstein2008CompetitionFP,
  title={Competition for Procurement Contracts with Service Guarantees},
  author={Fernando Bernstein and Francis de V{\'e}ricourt},
  journal={Oper. Res.},
  year={2008},
  volume={56},
  pages={562-575}
}
We consider a market with two suppliers and a set of buyers in search of procurement contracts with one of the suppliers. In particular, each buyer needs to process a certain volume of work, and each supplier's ability to process the customers' requests is constrained by a production capacity. The procurement contracts include guarantees that the products will be available when needed, and the buyers select a supplier based on their service delivery offers. The suppliers are modeled as make-to… 

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