Competition for Attention in the Information (Overload) Age

@article{Anderson2009CompetitionFA,
  title={Competition for Attention in the Information (Overload) Age},
  author={Simon P. Anderson and Andr{\'e} de Palma},
  journal={CEPR Discussion Paper Series},
  year={2009}
}
Limited consumer attention limits product market competition: prices are stochastically lower the more attention is paid. Ads compete to be the lowest price in a sector but compete for attention with ads from other sectors: equilibrium ad shares follow a CES form. When a sector gets more proÞtable, its advertising expands: others lose ad market share. The "information hump" shows highest ad levels for intermediate attention levels. The Information Age takes off when the number of viable sectors… Expand
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Limited attention, competition and welfare
  • A. Hefti
  • Computer Science
  • J. Econ. Theory
  • 2018
TLDR
A tractable framework is presented that embeds the allocation of limited attention into competition theory and explains why the individually rational decision to become less attentive in presence of more choice options may be catalyzed to a collective inattention trap over the market mechanism. Expand
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We study targeted information in a duopoly model with differentiated products, allowing for consumers with limited attention. The presence of inattentive consumers incentivizes firms to behave as ifExpand
JEL Classification : L 13 , D 43 Keywords : Media economics , advertising clutter , limited attention , information congestion , two-sided markets
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TLDR
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