Competition for Attention in the Information (Overload) Age

  title={Competition for Attention in the Information (Overload) Age},
  author={Simon P. Anderson and Andr{\'e} de Palma},
  journal={CEPR Discussion Paper Series},
Limited consumer attention limits product market competition: prices are stochastically lower the more attention is paid. Ads compete to be the lowest price in a sector but compete for attention with ads from other sectors: equilibrium ad shares follow a CES form. When a sector gets more proÞtable, its advertising expands: others lose ad market share. The "information hump" shows highest ad levels for intermediate attention levels. The Information Age takes off when the number of viable sectors… 

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