Competition between collective and individual dynamics

  title={Competition between collective and individual dynamics},
  author={Sebastian Grauwin and Eric Bertin and R{\'e}mi Lemoy and Pablo Jensen},
  journal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  pages={20622 - 20626}
Linking microscopic and macroscopic behavior is at the heart of many natural and social sciences. This apparent similarity conceals essential differences across disciplines: Although physical particles are assumed to optimize the global energy, economic agents maximize their own utility. Here, we solve exactly a Schelling-like segregation model, which interpolates continuously between cooperative and individual dynamics. We show that increasing the degree of cooperativity induces a qualitative… 

Figures from this paper

Effective Free Energy for Individual Dynamics
This paper builds both on statistical mechanics and the game theory notion of Potential Function to introduce a rigorous generalization of the physicist's free energy, which includes individual dynamics, which paves the way to analytical treatments of a wide range of socio-economic models and might bring new insights into them.
Self-Organized Societies: On the Sakoda Model of Social Interactions
We characterize the behavior and the social structures appearing from a model of general social interaction proposed by Sakoda. The model consists of two interacting populations in a two-dimensional
Jamming and pattern formation in models of segregation.
  • T. Rogers, A. McKane
  • Physics
    Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics
  • 2012
We investigate the Schelling model of social segregation, formulated as an intrinsically nonequilibrium system, in which the agents occupy districts (or patches) rather than sites on a grid. We show
Emergence of Simple Characteristics for Heterogeneous Complex Social Agents
This work generalizes the model to account for agent intrinsic heterogeneity, and finds two different simplification regimes, one dominated by interactions, where agents become simple and identical as in the homogeneous model, and one where agents remain strongly heterogeneous although effectively with simple characteristics.
Eco-evolutionary Spatial Dynamics of Nonlinear Social Dilemmas
Abstract Spatial dynamics can promote the evolution of cooperation. While dispersal processes have been studied in simple evolutionary games, real-world social dilemmas are much more complicated. The
Statistical Physics of Interacting Macroscopic Units
This chapter deals with the generic issue of the statistical description of large systems of interacting ’units’ under nonequilibrium conditions. These nonequilibrium units may be for instance
Competition among networks highlights the power of the weak
This work investigates how creating paths between networks leads to different Nash equilibria that determine their structural and dynamical properties and proposes a viewpoint where networks choose the connection strategies, in contrast with classical approaches where nodes are the active players.
Ecological feedback on diffusion dynamics
This work presents a thorough analysis of the ecologically driven evolutionary dynamics in a spatially extended version of ecological public goods games and shows how these evolutionary dynamics feedback into shaping the ecology thus together determining the fate of the system.
Eco-evolutionary spatial dynamics of non-linear social dilemmas
It is shown how the non-linearity in payoffs, resulting in synergy or discounting of public goods can alter the effective rate of return on the cooperative investment and the combined eco-evolutionary trajectory can be qualitatively different in cases on non- linear social dilemmas.


Dynamic models of segregation
The systemic effects are found to be overwhelming: there is no simple correspondence of individual incentive to collective results, and a general theory of ‘tipping’ begins to emerge.
A physical analogue of the Schelling model
A mathematical link between Schelling’s socio-economic model of segregation and the physics of clustering is presented and the economic concept of “utility” is replaced by the physics concept of a particle's internal energy.
Phase diagram of a Schelling segregation model
The collective behavior in a variant of Schelling’s segregation model is characterized with methods borrowed from statistical physics, in a context where their relevance was not conspicuous. A
Residential segregation in an all-integrationist world
Nonequilibrium statistical mechanics of the zero-range process and related models
We review recent progress on the zero-range process, a model of interacting particles which hop between the sites of a lattice with rates that depend on the occupancy of the departure site. We
LETTER: Statistical physics of the Schelling model of segregation
We investigate the static and dynamic properties of a celebrated model of social segregation, providing a complete explanation of the mechanisms leading to segregation both in one- and
The Dynamics of Schelling-Type Segregation Models and a Nonlinear Graph Laplacian Variational Problem
This paper analyzes a variant of the famous Schelling segregation model in economics as a dynamical system and proves an isoperimetric characterization of the global minimizers on the torus which enables them to explicitly obtain theglobal minimizers for the graph variational problem.
An Introduction to Econophysics: Correlations and Complexity in Finance
Economists and workers in the financial world will find useful the presentation of empirical analysis methods and well-formulated theoretical tools that might help describe systems composed of a huge number of interacting subsystems.
Whom Or What Does the Representative Individual Represent
Macroeconomic models often assume that the choices of all the diverse agents in one sector—consumers for example—can be considered as the choices of one "representative" standard utility maximizing
Understanding the social context of the Schelling segregation model
New and increasingly detailed survey data on preferences demonstrates the embeddedness of the Schelling selection process in the social behaviors of choosing alternative residential compositions and demonstrates that, in the multicultural context, seemingly mild preferences for living with similar neighbors carry the potential to be strong determinants for own race selectivity and residential segregation.