Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice

@inproceedings{Feess2015CompetingTM,
  title={Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice},
  author={Eberhard Feess and Christian Grund and Markus Walzl and Ansgar Wohlschlegel},
  year={2015}
}
We analyze mechanism choices of competing sellers with private valuations and show the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria where sellers with higher reservation value choose mechanisms with a lower selling probability and a larger revenue in case of trade. As an application we investigate the choice between posted prices and auctions and demonstrate that sellers refuse to offer posted prices as long as (risk-neutral) buyers do not differ with respect to their transaction costs in… CONTINUE READING

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