Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions
@article{Bonkoungou2020ComparingSC, title={Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions}, author={S. Bonkoungou and Alexander S. Nesterov}, journal={Microeconomics: Search; Learning; Information Costs & Specific Knowledge; Expectation & Speculation eJournal}, year={2020} }
Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new rules were strategy-proof. We explain this puzzle. We show that after the reforms the rules became more immune to strategic admissions: each… CONTINUE READING
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