• DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3526194
Corpus ID: 210713819

Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions

@article{Bonkoungou2020ComparingSC,
  title={Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions},
  author={S. Bonkoungou and Alexander S. Nesterov},
  journal={Microeconomics: Search; Learning; Information Costs & Specific Knowledge; Expectation & Speculation eJournal},
  year={2020}
}

S. Bonkoungou, Alexander S. Nesterov

Published 2020

Psychology, Economics

Microeconomics: Search; Learning; Information Costs & Specific Knowledge; Expectation & Speculation eJournal

Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new rules were strategy-proof. We explain this puzzle. We show that after the reforms the rules became more immune to strategic admissions: each… CONTINUE READING

View on SSRN

arxiv.org

Save to Library

Create Alert

Cite

Launch Research Feed