Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions

  title={Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions},
  author={Susan Athey and Jonathan D. Levin and Enrique Seira},
  journal={NBER Working Paper Series},
We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation towards these bidders, and can also generate higher revenue. We show that a private value auction model with endogenous participation can account for these qualitative effects of auction format. We estimate the model's… Expand
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Estimating Auctions with Externalities: The Case of USFS Timber Auctions
  • Joseph Kuehn
  • Business, Economics
  • Review of Economics and Statistics
  • 2019
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Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions
We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auctionExpand
Data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions are used to test Vickrey's original proposition that sealed-bid and open auctions yield equal revenue. Models for the high-bid in an auction areExpand
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