Comparing Equilibria for Game-Theoretic and Evolutionary Bargaining Models

@inproceedings{Fatima2003ComparingEF,
  title={Comparing Equilibria for Game-Theoretic and Evolutionary Bargaining Models},
  author={S. Shaheen Fatima and Michael J. Wooldridge and Nicholas R. Jennings},
  year={2003}
}
Game-theoretic models of bargaining are typically based on the assumption that players have perfect rationality and that they always play an equilibrium strategy. In contrast, research in experimental economics shows that in bargaining between human subjects, participants do not always play the equilibrium strategy. Such agents are said to be boundedly rational. In playing a game against a boundedly rational opponent, a player’s most effective strategy is not the equilibrium strategy, but the… CONTINUE READING
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