Communicating Statistical Information

  title={Communicating Statistical Information},
  author={Ulrich Hoffrage and Samuel Lindsey and Ralph Hertwig and Gerd Gigerenzer},
  pages={2261 - 2262}
Most people, experts included, have difficulties understanding and combining statistical information effectively. Hoffrage et al. demonstrate that these difficulties can be considerably reduced by communicating the information in terms of natural frequencies rather than in terms of probabilities. Several applications in medicine, legal decision-making, and education are discussed. 

The Language of Conditional Probability

Statistical terms are accurate and powerful but can sometimes lead to misleading impressions among beginning students. Discrepancies between the popular and statistical meanings of “conditional” are

How to confuse with statistics or: the use and misuse of conditional probabilities

How consumers of statistical information may be confused when this information is presented in terms of conditional probabilities is shown and how either confusion or lies can be avoided by using alternative modes of conveying statistical information is suggested.

Edinburgh medical students 1872

absolute risk reduction). The wide scope for manipulating representations of statistical information is a challenge to the ideal of informed consent. 16 Where there is a risk of influencing outcomes

Communication of risks: an analysis beyond numbers.

  • A. GhoshK. Ghosh
  • Medicine
    QJM : monthly journal of the Association of Physicians
  • 2003
Sir, The recent commentary by Professor McManus1 provides an excellent overview of Dr Gigerenzer’s book, and summarizes the overwhelming appeal of ‘natural frequency’ over traditional descriptions

Communicating Quantitative Risk Information

This chapter reviews literature indicating that some representations and formats of quantitative risk information are easier to understand than others, and details the ways in which the message sender, a risk communicator, may hinder effective communication.

The Non-Use of Bayes Rule: Representative Evidence on Bounded Rationality

The results show that only a small fraction of the population responds consistently with Bayes'' rule, and that the probability to give normatively correctanswers decreases with the level of education.

To Bayes or Not to Bayes? A Comparison of Two Classes of Models of Information Aggregation

The DMs' aggregates were more in line with the naive Bayes rule when the advisors provided extreme forecasts were highly consistent with each other, and induced high levels of confidence, and their aggregateswere predicted well by a simple averaging rule.

Communicating Research Findings

The use of ratio statistics, percentages, and natural frequencies for communicating the magnitude of effects are discussed, and different methods for presenting mean differences, bivariate effects, and incremental validity in graphical displays are discussed.



How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning: Comment on Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995)

G. Gigerenzer and U. Hoffrage (1995) claimed that Bayesian inference problems, which have been notoriously difficult for laypeople to solve using base rates, hit rates, and false-alarm rates, become

Using natural frequencies to improve diagnostic inferences

Representing information in natural frequencies is a fast and effective way of facilitating diagnosis insight, which in turn helps physicians to better communicate risks to patients, and patients to better understand these risks.

The Interdependence of Science and Law

The use of court-appointed scientific experts in technical cases to assist judges in gleaning unbiased information and determining the validity of scientific evidence is used.

How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction: Frequency Formats

By analyzing several thousand solutions to Bayesian problems, the authors found that when information was presented in frequency formats, statistically naive participants derived up to 50% of all inferences by Bayesian algorithms.

The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative, and methodological challenges

  • J. Koehler
  • Psychology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1996
Abstract We have been oversold on the base rate fallacy in probabilistic judgment from an empirical, normative, and methodological standpoint. At the empirical level, a thorough examination of the

The Random Match Probability (RMP) in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?

It is shown that R MPs contribute little to an assessment of the diagnostic significance of a reported DNA match beyond that given by the false positive laboratory error rate when RMPs are several orders of magnitude smaller than this error rate.

Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence at Trial

This Article identifies some of the subtle, but common, exaggerations that have occurred at trial, and classifies each in relation to the three questions that are suggested by the chain of reasoning

AIDS counselling for low-risk clients.

This study addresses the counselling of heterosexual men with low-risk behaviour who, voluntarily or involuntarily, take an HIV test and proposes a simple method that counsellors can learn to communicate risks in a more effective way.

A Handbook for data analysis in the behavioral sciences : methodological issues

This book discusses methodological and statistical issues surrounding the development of Mathematical Models in Psychology, as well as some of the techniques used in Bayesian Statistics, a branch of statistics based on Bayesian inference.

Efficacy of screening mammography. A meta-analysis.

Screening mammography may be effective in reducing breast cancer mortality in women aged 40 to 49 years after 10 to 12 years of follow-up, but the same benefit could probably be achieved by beginning screening at menopause or 50 years of age.