Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness: Does anyone care about functional zombies?

  title={Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness: Does anyone care about functional zombies?},
  author={Bryce Huebner},
  journal={Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
  • Bryce Huebner
  • Published 1 March 2010
  • Philosophy
  • Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows these commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I report the results of two experiments on purportedly phenomenal states and I argue that many disputes over the philosophical notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ are misguided—they fail to capture the… 
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