Common ownership of public goods

  title={Common ownership of public goods},
  author={Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka and Evagelos Pafilis},
  journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
We analyze optimal ownership of public goods in a repeated game focusing on common ownership. Under common ownership an owner’s access to the public good cannot be restricted by other owners. We find that under common ownership both the value of the relationship and the gain from deviation are high. Common ownership is optimal when the marginal return to maintenance investments is low consistent with the stylized facts. 

Figures from this paper

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information
Abstract Consider two parties who can make non-contractible investments in the provision of a public good. Who should own the physical assets needed to provide the public good? In the literature itExpand
Compliance Technology and Self-Enforcing Agreements
We analyze a repeated game in which countries are polluting as well as investing in technologies. While folk theorems point out that the first best can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibriumExpand
Policies and Instruments for Self-Enforcing Treaties
We characterize the optimal policy and policy instruments for self-enforcing treaties when countries invest in green technology before they pollute. If the discount factor is too small to support theExpand
Can Technological Change Weaken the Robustness of Common-Property Regimes?
We examine the effect of technological change on the incentives to cooperate in the provision of common-pool resources (CPRs). We focus our analysis on CPRs that require investments in improvementExpand


Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods
There has been a dramatic change in the division of responsibility between the state and the private sector for the delivery of public goods and services in recent years with an increasing trendExpand
Reputation and Allocation of Ownership
The allocation of ownership matters even in long--term relationships. Ownership structure is chosen to encourage co--operation. The optimal ownership structure of the static game restricts the gainExpand
A Theory of Joint Asset Ownership
I offer a theory of joint ownership by extending the standard property right theory of the firm to situations where parties can endogenously choose the degree of specificity of their investmentsExpand
Nature of human capital, technology and ownership of public goods
Besley and Ghatak (2001) show that public good should be owned by the agent who values the public good most — irrespective of technological factors. In this paper we relax their assumptions in aExpand
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Our theory of costly contracts emphasizes that contractual rights can be of two types: specific rights and residual rights. When it is costly to list all specific rights over assets in the contract,Expand
Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances
Different scenarios in which the optimal ownership structure may change over time due to a trade-off between inducing know-how disclosure and ensuring maximum effort are characterized. Expand
Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships
  • O. Hart
  • Political Science, Business
  • 2002
The question of what should determine the boundaries between public and private firms in an advanced capitalist economy is a highly topical one. In this paper I discuss some recent theoreticalExpand
Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services
We model public-private partnershios in building and managing facilities for the provision of public services. In particular,we analyze both the desirability of bundling the building and managementExpand
Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points
We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of value and cost uncertainty. A contract fixing price works well in normal times because there is nothing to argueExpand
Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams
This paper studies moral hazard in teams using a model where efforts are promoted via the combination of profit shares and relational contracts. The focus is on how these two forms of incentivesExpand