Common language or Tower of Babel? On the evolutionary dynamics of signals and their meanings.

@article{Baalen2003CommonLO,
  title={Common language or Tower of Babel? On the evolutionary dynamics of signals and their meanings.},
  author={Minus van Baalen and Vincent A A Jansen},
  journal={Proceedings. Biological sciences},
  year={2003},
  volume={270 1510},
  pages={69-76}
}
We investigate how the evolution of communication strategies affects signal credibility when there is common interest as well as a conflict between communicating individuals. Taking alarm calls as an example, we show that if the temptation to cheat is low, a single signal is used in the population. If the temptation increases cheaters will erode the credibility of a signal, and an honest mutant using a different signal ('a private code') will be very successful until this, in turn, is cracked… CONTINUE READING

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