Common Ownership and Competition in the Ready-To-Eat Cereal Industry ∗
@inproceedings{Backus2018CommonOA,
title={Common Ownership and Competition in the Ready-To-Eat Cereal Industry ∗},
author={Matthew Backus and C. Conlon and M. Sinkinson},
year={2018}
}Publicly-traded firms have a fiduciary duty to shareholders, which motivates the assumption of firm-level profit maximization. However, if those shareholders have an interest in competitors, the assumption might be misguided. We begin by documenting a broad increase in common ownership over time and show the implications for firm incentives through the lens of profit weights. We then investigate this concern in the ready-to-eat cereal industry, using matched product-market and ownership data… CONTINUE READING
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