Commodity Taxation and Social Insurance

@inproceedings{Costa2004CommodityTA,
  title={Commodity Taxation and Social Insurance},
  author={C. Da Costa},
  year={2004}
}
We investigate optimal commodity taxation in a social insurance framework based on Varian (1980). We show that the tax prescriptions in this moral hazard framework are notably similar to those derived from models based on Mirrlees’ (1971) self-selection framework. In particular, Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) results on uniform commodity taxation are valid in this setup. We incorporate pre-committed goods — those whose consumption must be decided before the resolution of uncertainty — and show… CONTINUE READING

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