Comments on Goodman's Ways of Worldmaking

@article{Hempel2004CommentsOG,
  title={Comments on Goodman's Ways of Worldmaking},
  author={Carl G. Hempel},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2004},
  volume={45},
  pages={193-199}
}
  • C. Hempel
  • Published 1 October 1980
  • Philosophy
  • Synthese
1. Nelson Goodman's book and Hilary Putnam's observations on it evoked in me vivid memories of the conception of empirical know ledge that was propounded by Otto Neurath of the Vienna Circle about 1930, and which contrasted sharply with the views held by other members of the Circle at that time. Neurath certainly cannot be claimed to have anticipated Good man's ideas with their very wide scope; moreover, there are also important differences in fundamentals. But there are striking similarities… 
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Each of these stages of a research project are evaluated to clarify the sources of ambiguities and uncertainties and suggestions are offered for reducing errors and speeding scientific progress.