• DOI:10.1177/0165025407083670
• Corpus ID: 145744721

Commentary: The Problems of Prejudice, Discrimination, and Exclusion

@article{Turiel2007CommentaryTP,
  title={Commentary: The Problems of Prejudice, Discrimination, and Exclusion},
  author={Elliot Turiel},
  journal={International Journal of Behavioral Development},
  year={2007},
  volume={31},
  pages={419 - 422}
}

• E. Turiel
• Published 1 September 2007
• Sociology
• International Journal of Behavioral Development

and philosophers for a long time. For many researchers, concepts of self are connected to concepts of identity and both are somewhat elusive. Aside from the problem of how to assess self and identity, theorists have confronted difficult questions in attempting to formulate these constructs. One difficult issue revolves around the validity of the constructs as singular entities. We tend to think that people have a concept of self and an identity. We then go on to try to specify what concept of self an individual holds and what is his or her identity. In specifying these ideas social scientists, including psychologists, often resort to dichotomies that serve to divide the world and its people into being this or that; as maintaining this concept of self or that concept of self; as possessing this identity or that identity. For example, psychologists have resorted to the idea that there are cultural orientations people incorporate that determine the nature of selves. A common view among social psychologists (Markus & Kitiyama, 1991) is that Western conceptions of self are ones of independence and autonomy, differing from non-Western conceptions of selves as interdependent. Some anthropologists have put it in terms of a difference between a “bounded” and “unbounded” self (Geertz, 1973). Others have provided analyses of conflicts in the world through the ideas that they are manifested in a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996), which is another Western versus non-Western classification based largely on presumed religious differences. Similarly, conflicts within the United States have been portrayed as “culture wars,” based largely on differences in moral values between conservatives and liberals (usually around issues like abortion, sexual freedoms, sexual orientations, gun control, and the death penalty). The ideas of cultural orientations of independence or interdependence, as well as whole civilizations at odds with each other or sub-groups within American society at war with each other, entail broad groupings with people affiliated only with one or the other. However, when psychologists attempt to examine concepts of self or a sense of identity, they face serious difficulties as soon as they ask the questions, what is self? or what makes for identity? This is because it is difficult to know how self, for instance, can be characterized when individuals engage in so many activities in their lives, have so many interests, develop so many areas of thought and knowledge, fill so many roles, maintain so many preferences, etc. (such a list can be endless). Similarly, an individual’s “identity” can be tied to activities, interests, realms of thought and knowledge, and roles. Perhaps in contrast with the notion of self, we tend to frame the notion of identity around group affiliations. But a corresponding question that inevitably arises is how can we characterize an individual’s identity when he or she is part of so many groups: race, ethnicity, social class, nationality, culture, religion, occupation, political affiliations, sexual orientation, language, etc. Recently, philosophers, such as Appiah (2005) and Sen (2006), who is also a Noble Prize winning economist, have argued that pigeonholing people into singular categories, with dichotomies that supposedly reflect differences between groups or civilizations, is reductionistic and only serves to stereotype people into operating as one type. Identities are multiple, more than one identity has importance to people, and people must make choices as to the relative importance to attach to different loyalties in particular contexts. They have gone further to argue that assumptions about identity as singular contribute to the conflicts and violence in the world by slighting over the plurality of people’s affiliations with a variety of groups. The claim is not that scholars seek to foment violence through their insistence on singular identities. Rather, it is that scholars accept the illusion of singular identity through assertions that individuals are members of one particular group or community and in that way fail to recognize the importance of choice and reason in human functioning. The illusion of singular identity, “which serves the violent purposes of those orchestrating such confrontations, is skillfully cultivated and fomented by the commanders of persecution and carnage” (Sen, 2006, p. 175). In these views, the illusion of singular identity, with its terrible consequences, inadvertently receives support from schools of intellectual thought that focus on the significance of predetermined community identity (i.e., communitarians) and global cultural orientations. According to Sen (2006, p. xvii) an alternative approach is essential: