Comment on “The Free Will Theorem”

  title={Comment on “The Free Will Theorem”},
  author={Roderich Tumulka},
  journal={Foundations of Physics},
  • R. Tumulka
  • Published 29 November 2006
  • Physics
  • Foundations of Physics
In a recent paper Conway and Kochen, Found. Phys. 36, 2006, claim to have established that theories of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (RW) type, i.e., of spontaneous wave function collapse, cannot be made relativistic. On the other hand, relativistic GRW-type theories have already been presented, in my recent paper, J. Stat. Phys. 125, 2006, and by Dowker and Henson, J. Stat. Phys. 115, 2004. Here, I elucidate why these are not excluded by the arguments of Conway and Kochen. 
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