Combining Patronage and Merit in Public Sector Recruitment

  title={Combining Patronage and Merit in Public Sector Recruitment},
  author={Sarah Brierley},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  pages={182 - 197}
  • S. Brierley
  • Published 10 December 2018
  • Political Science
  • The Journal of Politics
When do politicians in developing democracies prioritize meritocratic recruitment over patronage hiring for public sector jobs? I distinguish between low- and high-skilled positions and argue that the former are valuable for sustaining party machines, while manipulating the latter can undermine state performance. Accordingly, politicians will interfere to ensure their copartisans are hired to low-skilled jobs but select bureaucrats for high-skilled positions based on meritocratic criteria. I… 

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