Combinatorial auctions

@article{Abrache2007CombinatorialA,
  title={Combinatorial auctions},
  author={Jawad Abrache and Teodor Gabriel Crainic and Michel Gendreau and Monia Rekik},
  journal={Annals of Operations Research},
  year={2007},
  volume={153},
  pages={131-164}
}
Abstract Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of multiple heterogeneous items. In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial auctions. These issues are related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids, the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation, and the need for… 
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References

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TLDR
This paper discusses several complex issues related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids, the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation, and the need for decision support tools to help participants make profitable bidding decisions.
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TLDR
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