Combinatorial Information Market Design

@article{Hanson2003CombinatorialIM,
  title={Combinatorial Information Market Design},
  author={Robin D. Hanson},
  journal={Information Systems Frontiers},
  year={2003},
  volume={5},
  pages={107-119}
}
  • R. Hanson
  • Published 2003
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • Information Systems Frontiers
Information markets are markets created to aggregate information. Such markets usually estimate a probability distribution over the values of certain variables, via bets on those values. Combinatorial information markets would aggregate information on the entire joint probability distribution over many variables, by allowing bets on all variable value combinations. To achieve this, we want to overcome the thin market and irrational participation problems that plague standard information markets… Expand
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