Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices

  title={Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices},
  author={Michal Feldman and Nick Gravin and Brendan Lucier},
We study mechanisms for the submodular combinatorial auction problem in a Bayesian setting. In this problem, m indivisible goods are to be allocated among n buyers, whose valuations are drawn independently from known distributions over submodular functions (and, more generally, fractionally subadditive functions). We design a posted-price mechanism that is dominant strategy incentive compatible, runs in time polynomial in n and m, and achieves a constant fraction of the expected optimal social… CONTINUE READING
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