Collusive Price Leadership in Retail Pharmacies in Chile
@inproceedings{Chilet2018CollusivePL, title={Collusive Price Leadership in Retail Pharmacies in Chile}, author={Jorge Ale Chilet}, year={2018} }
I analyze price leadership among three retail pharmacy chains in Chile during a case of collusion. The pharmacies reached higher prices using staggered price increases on hundreds of drugs. The leader of these increases was the chain with the fewest number of stores. The same chain was the one that also relied the most on the local retail market. I find that the time it took the followers to raise prices after the leader’s increase is negatively correlated with the degree of firm dominance of… CONTINUE READING
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