College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized

  title={College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized},
  author={Isa Emin Hafalir and Rustamdjan Hakimov and Dorothea K{\"u}bler and Morimitsu Kurino},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
College Admissions with Entrance Exams: Centralized versus Decentralized by Isa E. Hafalir, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler and Morimitsu Kurino * We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college… CONTINUE READING
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