Collectively incentive compatible tax systems

  title={Collectively incentive compatible tax systems},
  author={Felix J. Bierbrauer},
This paper assumes that individuals possess private information both about their abilities and about their valuation of a public good. Individuals can undertake collective actions on order to manipulate the tax system and the decision on public good provision. Consequently, an implementable scheme of taxation has to be collectively incentive compatible. If preferences are additively separable, then an implementable tax systems has the following properties: (i) tax payments do not depend on… CONTINUE READING

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