Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences

@article{Tollefsen2002CollectiveIA,
  title={Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences},
  author={D. Tollefsen},
  journal={Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
  year={2002},
  volume={32},
  pages={25 - 50}
}
  • D. Tollefsen
  • Published 2002
  • Sociology
  • Philosophy of the Social Sciences
  • In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group. Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional… CONTINUE READING
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