Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes

@inproceedings{Walker2000CollectiveCI,
  title={Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes},
  author={James M. Walker and Roy Gardner and Andrew Herr and Elinor Ostrom},
  year={2000}
}
  • James M. Walker, Roy Gardner, +1 author Elinor Ostrom
  • Published 2000
  • Economics
  • We analyse and empirically examine a multi-level common-pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective-choice level game and an operational-level game. In the collective-choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency relative to a baseline with no opportunity for… CONTINUE READING

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