Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms: the principled optimism of Elinor Ostrom

@article{Auer2014CollectiveAA,
  title={Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms: the principled optimism of Elinor Ostrom},
  author={Matthew R. Auer},
  journal={Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research},
  year={2014},
  volume={6},
  pages={265 - 271}
}
  • M. Auer
  • Published 23 September 2014
  • Psychology
  • Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research
Of her many contributions to the social, behavioral and applied natural sciences, which title by Elinor ‘Lin’ Ostrom towers over all others? Answering this question is no simple task. The amount of... 
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3 Citations
Highly Influential Citations
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3 Citations

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  • E. Ostrom
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    American Economic Review
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Collective action problems Since the foundational work of Mancur Olson (1965), the concept of collective action has gained prominence in all of the social sciences. Given the structure of an initial…
The evolution of environmentally responsible investment: An Adam Smith perspective
Challenges to Proponents of Common Property Recource Systems: Despairing Voices from the Social Forests of Zimbabwe
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TLDR
This work aims to present a positive theory of public good games towards a Positive Theory of Public Good Games, as a guide to experimentation in the Social Sciences.
Endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful: Elinor Ostrom and the diversity of institutions
Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows. There is grandeur in…
The role of communication in resolving commons dilemmas: experimental evidence with heterogeneous appropriators
Abstract Communication has been shown to be an effective mechanism for promoting efficient resource use in homogeneous common-pool resource settings. Communication allows appropriators the…
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