• Corpus ID: 245650842

Coherence of probabilistic constraints on Nash equilibria

  title={Coherence of probabilistic constraints on Nash equilibria},
  author={Sandro Preto and Eduardo Ferm'e and Marcelo Finger},
Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he assigns subjective probabilities to players’ actions. However, not all probabilistic assignments are coherent with a given game. We study the decision problem of determining if a given set of probabilistic constraints assigned a priori by the observer to a given… 

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