Coherence as an ideal of rationality

  title={Coherence as an ideal of rationality},
  author={Lyle Zynda},
  • L. Zynda
  • Published 2004
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Synthese
Probabilistic coherence is not an absolute requirement of rationality; nevertheless, it is an ideal of rationality with substantive normative import. An idealized rational agent who avoided making implicit logical errors in forming his preferences would be coherent. In response to the challenge, recently made by epistemologists such as Foley and Plantinga, that appeals to ideal rationality render probabilism either irrelevant or implausible, I argue that idealized requirements can be… Expand
Measuring the overall incoherence of credence functions
  • J. Staffel
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Synthese
  • 2014
It is argued that one particular Dutch book measure and a corresponding distance measure are particularly well suited for capturing the overall degree of incoherence of a credence function. Expand
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It would be good to have a Bayesian decision theory that assesses our decisions and thinking according to everyday standards of rationality— standards that do not require logical omniscience (GarberExpand
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  • S. Hansson
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Stud Logica
  • 2006
It is argued that ideal world semantics should be given up in favour of other, more plausible uses of possible worlds for modelling normative subject-matter. Expand
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Evidence that rationalization is unique to humans is provided and it is argued thatrationalization processes are aimed at creating the fictions the authors prefer to believe and maintaining the impression that they are psychologically coherent and rational. Expand
The Analysis of the Redundancy of the Dutch Book Argument: Separability of Degrees of Belief and Preferences
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The accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition
  • D. Thorstad
  • Computer Science
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 2021
It is argued that bounded agents face a systematic accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition: whether to structure their cognition in ways likely to promote coherence or accuracy, and how this arises out of at least two component tradeoffs. Expand
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The Fallibility Norm—the claim that we ought to take our fallibility into account when managing our beliefs—appears to conflict with several other compelling epistemic norms. To shed light on theseExpand
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Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters
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Utilising Explanatory Factors in Induction?
  • M. Tregear
  • Philosophy
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 2004
This paper considers how explanatory factors can play a role in our ampliative inferential practices. Van Fraassen has argued that there is no possible rational rule that governs ampliativeExpand


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M. J. Cresswell is a logician and philosopher of language who has been a major continuing influence on the growth and development of formal semantics over the past 15 years or more. This book is theExpand
Working without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology
In this book Foley offers a major new theory of rationality. His aim is to escape the 'doldrums of Descartes' by lowering the standard for what is rational from his impossibly demanding level ofExpand
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ConclusionThe discussion above indicates that there is some reason for optimism with regard to the project of incorporating logical-mathematical learning within Bayesianism, though it is obvious thatExpand
There is an underground stream in modern epistemology, starting from Pascal and Huygens in the seventeenth century. In ours, it is represented largely, but not wholly, by the writers who callExpand
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This is a guide to the practical art of plausible reasoning, this book has relevance in every field of intellectual activity. Professor Polya, a world-famous mathematician from Stanford University,Expand
Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them
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Probability and the Art of Judgment
Preface 1. Introduction: radical probabilism 2. Valuation an dacceptance of scientific hypotheses 3. Probable knowledge 4. Probability and the art of judgment 5. Bayesianism with a human face 6.Expand
Scorekeeping in a language game
  • David Lewis
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • J. Philos. Log.
  • 1979
It’s not as easy as you might think to say something that will be unacceptable for lack of required presuppositions, and straightway that presupposition springs into existence, making what you said acceptable after all. Expand
Laws and symmetry
Introduction Part I: Are there laws of nature? What are the laws of nature? Ideal science: David Lewis's account of laws Necessity, worlds, and chance Universals: Laws grounded in nature Part II:Expand