Coevolution of Trustful Buyers and Cooperative Sellers in the Trust Game

  title={Coevolution of Trustful Buyers and Cooperative Sellers in the Trust Game},
  author={Naoki Masuda and Mitsuhiro Nakamura},
  journal={PLoS ONE},
Many online marketplaces enjoy great success. Buyers and sellers in successful markets carry out cooperative transactions even if they do not know each other in advance and a moral hazard exists. An indispensable component that enables cooperation in such social dilemma situations is the reputation system. Under the reputation system, a buyer can avoid transacting with a seller with a bad reputation. A transaction in online marketplaces is better modeled by the trust game than other social… 

Figures from this paper

An N-player Trust game: comparison of replicator and logit dynamics

Trust and trustworthiness are fundamental aspects of society. Trust acts as the glue which holds a social system together. The greater the levels of trust, the greater the stability of the society.

Expectations of Fairness and Trust Co-Evolve in Environments of Partial Information

It is demonstrated that both trust and fairness can simultaneously be revenue maximizing, and given the plausible condition of partially obscured information and partner choice, trust mediates the generation of costly punishment.

Expectations of Fairness and Trust Coevolve Because of Partial Information

When playing one-shot economic games, individuals often blindly trust others, accepting partnerships without any information regarding the trustworthiness of their partner. Consequently, they risk

Learning to trust, learning to be trustworthy

Interpersonal trust is a one-sided social dilemma.Building on the binary trust game, we ask how trust and trustworthiness can evolve in a population where partners are matched randomly and agents

Adaptive Reputation Promotes Trust in Social Networks

If investors have access to the reputation scores of trustees, the fraction of untrustworthy trustees drops if only the degree of rationality is sufficiently large, and this irrespective of the reputation threshold that determines the cutoff for untrustworthiness.

Costly reputation building still promotes the collective trust within the networked population

Trust is of vital importance to economic development, social harmony, political stability and cultural succession in the real world, and then understanding how trust emerges and evolves in a selfish

A Synergy of Institutional Incentives and Networked Structures in Evolutionary Game Dynamics of Multiagent Systems

Using evolutionary game theory, it is shown that punishing antisocial agents and a regular networked structure not only promote prosocial behaviors among agents playing the trust game, but they also interplay with each other, leading to interference or synergy, depending on the game parameters.

Honesty biases trustworthiness impressions.

It is shown that individuals prefer trusting honest others who share truthful information, especially if honest behavior is consistent over time, and a mechanistic account for biases in social learning and social interactions is provided, advancing the understanding of social behaviors in particular and human cognition in general.

The Impact of Third-Party Information on Trust: Valence, Source, and Reliability

If third-party information is positive, experience of a friend has the strongest effect on trusting followed by friend’s gossip, while negative information is more salient for withholding trust than positive information is for placing trust.



The Evolution of Trust and Reputation. Results from Simulation Experiments and Analysis from Auction Data

In online interactions in general, but especially in interactions between buyers and sellers on internet-auction platforms, the interacting parties must deal with trust and cooperation problems.

The Evolution of Trust in Non-Simultaneous Exchange Situations

Trust is an important concept that intersects a number of different disciplines, including economics, sociology, and political science, and maintains some meaning even in the natural sciences. Any

The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity.

Reputation in Online Auctions: The Market for Trust

Online markets have dramatically altered the retail landscape. By eliminating barriers associated with geography as well as the physical costs of maintaining a storefront, online markets have created

How Effective are Online Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Study

It is found that while the feedback mechanism induces quite a substantial improvement in transaction efficiency, it also exhibits a kind of public goods problem in that, unlike in the partners market, the benefits of trust and trustworthy behavior go to the whole community and are not completely internalized.

How should we define goodness?--reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity.

Reputation and Efficiency in Social Interactions: An Example of Network Effects

Reputations emerge if an actor's future partners are informed on his present behavior. Reputations depend on the "embeddedness" of interactions in structures or networks of social relations. They