Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems

@article{Kesten2009CoalitionalSA,
  title={Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems},
  author={Onur Kesten},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
  year={2009},
  volume={38},
  pages={17-21}
}
  • Onur Kesten
  • Published 2009
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • International Journal of Game Theory
  • We consider the problem of allocating houses to agents when monetary compensations are not allowed. We present a simple and independent proof of a result due to Ehlers and Klaus (Int J Game Theory 32:545–560, 2004) that characterizes the class of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, resource monotonicity and nonbossiness. 
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