Coalition formation under uncertainty: bargaining equilibria and the Bayesian core stability concept

@inproceedings{Chalkiadakis2007CoalitionFU,
  title={Coalition formation under uncertainty: bargaining equilibria and the Bayesian core stability concept},
  author={Georgios Chalkiadakis and Evangelos Markakis and Craig Boutilier},
  booktitle={AAMAS '07},
  year={2007}
}
Coalition formation is a problem of great interest in AI, allowing groups of autonomous, rational agents to form stable teams. Furthermore, the study of coalitional stability concepts and their relation to equilibria that guide the strategic interactions of agents during bargaining has lately attracted much attention. However, research to date in both AI and economics has largely ignored the potential presence of uncertainty when studying either coalitional stability or coalitional bargaining… CONTINUE READING

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