Coalition formation as a dynamic process

@article{Konishi2003CoalitionFA,
  title={Coalition formation as a dynamic process},
  author={Hideo Konishi and Debraj Ray},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
  year={2003},
  volume={110},
  pages={1-41}
}
We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process, with payoffs generated as coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. A process of coalition formation (PCF) is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be ‘‘justified’’ by the expectation of higher future value, compared to inaction. This future value, in turn, is endogenous: it depends on coalitional movements at each node. We study existence of equilibrium PCFs. We connect deterministic equilibrium PCFs with… CONTINUE READING
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