Corpus ID: 237940503

Coalition Formation in Constant Sum Queueing Games

  title={Coalition Formation in Constant Sum Queueing Games},
  author={Shiksha Singhal and Veeraruna Kavitha and Jayakrishnan Nair},
We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of providers) is fixed, and dictated by the total size of the market. The game thus captures the tension between resource pooling (to benefit from the resulting statistical economies of scale) and competition between coalitions over market share. In a departure… Expand
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