Coalition Formation and Price of Anarchy in Cournot Oligopolies

@inproceedings{Immorlica2010CoalitionFA,
  title={Coalition Formation and Price of Anarchy in Cournot Oligopolies},
  author={Nicole Immorlica and Evangelos Markakis and Georgios Piliouras},
  booktitle={WINE},
  year={2010}
}
Non-cooperative game theory purports that economic agents behave with little regard towards the negative externalities they impose on each other. Such behaviors generally lead to inefficient outcomes where the social welfare is bounded away from its optimal value. However, in practice, self-interested individuals explore the possibility of circumventing such negative externalities by forming coalitions. What sort of coalitions should we expect to arise? How do they affect the social welfare? We… CONTINUE READING
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