Co-opetition and Investment for Supply-Chain Resilience

@article{Bakshi2008CoopetitionAI,
  title={Co-opetition and Investment for Supply-Chain Resilience},
  author={Nitin Bakshi and Paul R. Kleindorfer},
  journal={Organizations \& Markets eJournal},
  year={2008}
}
This paper considers the problem of disruption risk management in global supply chains. We consider a supply chain with two participants, who face interdependent losses resulting from supply chain disruptions such as terrorist strikes and natural hazards. The Harsanyi-Selten-Nash bargaining framework is used to model the supply chain participants' choice of risk mitigation investments. The bargaining approach allows a framing of both joint financing of mitigation activities before the fact and… 
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