Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust

@inproceedings{Kliemt2006CoevolutionOP,
  title={Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust},
  author={Hartmut Kliemt and Bezalel Peleg},
  year={2006}
}
In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the 'information technology' of individual decision makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally by players who differ in their informational as well as in their preference type. Relative success of alternative decisions feeds back on the type composition of the population which in turn influences… CONTINUE READING

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