Closeness matters: monotonicity failure in IRV elections with three candidates

@article{Miller2012ClosenessMM,
  title={Closeness matters: monotonicity failure in IRV elections with three candidates},
  author={Nicholas R. Miller},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year={2012},
  volume={173},
  pages={91-108}
}
A striking attribute of instant runoff voting (IRV) is that it is subject to monotonicity failure—that is, getting more (first-preference) votes may result in defeat for a candidate who would otherwise have won and getting fewer votes may result in victory for a candidate who otherwise would have lost. Proponents of IRV have argued that monotonicity failure, while a mathematical possibility, is highly unlikely to occur in practice. This paper specifies the precise conditions under which this… 
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