Corpus ID: 2827127

Cloning in Elections

@inproceedings{Elkind2010CloningIE,
  title={Cloning in Elections},
  author={E. Elkind and P. Faliszewski and A. Slinko},
  booktitle={AAAI},
  year={2010}
}
We consider the problem of manipulating elections via cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by one or more clones, i.e., new candidates that are so similar to c that each voter simply replaces c in his vote with the block of c's clones. The outcome of the resulting election may then depend on how each voter orders the clones within the block. We formalize what it means for a cloning manipulation to be successful (which turns out to be a surprisingly… Expand
31 Citations
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