Clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints

@article{Goel2014ClinchingAB,
  title={Clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints},
  author={G. Goel and V. Mirrokni and Renato Paes Leme},
  journal={Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation},
  year={2014}
}
Constraints on agent's ability to pay play a major role in auction design for any setting where the magnitude of financial transactions is sufficiently large. Those constraints have been traditionally modeled in mechanism design as hard budget, i.e., mechanism is not allowed to charge agents more than a certain amount. Yet, real auction systems (such as Google AdWords) allow more sophisticated constraints on agents' ability to pay, such as average budgets. In this work, we investigate the… Expand
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