Climate change and game theory

  title={Climate change and game theory},
  author={Peter Wood},
  journal={Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences},
  • P. Wood
  • Published 1 February 2011
  • Economics
  • Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from noncooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. We examine the solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, as well as games where players make decisions about treaty participation. The implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such… 
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