Clickstream tracking of TOR users: may be easier than you think

  title={Clickstream tracking of TOR users: may be easier than you think},
  author={Natalija Vlajic and Pooria Madani and Ethan Nguyen},
  journal={Journal of Cyber Security Technology},
  pages={108 - 92}
ABSTRACT As the importance and prevalence of web analytics have increased over the last decade, so has the number of user trying to maintain their online anonymity. The Onion Routing (TOR) system is often seen as the best anonymity tool out there and is used by nearly 2.5 million people daily. For a significant number of these users, many of TOR’s features and terms are rather difficult to comprehend; yet, these users tend to believe that TOR offers more privacy protection than what it is… 
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