• DOI:10.1145/1250910.1250954
Corpus ID: 8909161

Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges

@inproceedings{Abraham2007ClearingAF,
  title={Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges},
  author={D. Abraham and A. Blum and T. Sandholm},
  booktitle={EC '07},
  year={2007}
}

D. Abraham, A. Blum, T. Sandholm

Published in EC '07 2007

Computer Science

In barter-exchange markets, agents seek to swap their items with one another, in order to improve their own utilities. These swaps consist of cycles of agents, with each agent receiving the item of the next agent in the cycle. We focus mainly on the upcoming national kidney-exchange market, where patients with kidney disease can obtain compatible donors by swapping their own willing but incompatible donors. With over 70,000 patients already waiting for a cadaver kidney in the US, this market is… CONTINUE READING

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