ClearShot: Eavesdropping on Keyboard Input from Video

  title={ClearShot: Eavesdropping on Keyboard Input from Video},
  author={Davide Balzarotti and Marco Cova and Giovanni Vigna},
  journal={2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008)},
Eavesdropping on electronic communication is usually prevented by using cryptography-based mechanisms. However, these mechanisms do not prevent one from obtaining private information through side channels, such as the electromagnetic emissions of monitors or the sound produced by keyboards. While extracting the same information by watching somebody typing on a keyboard might seem to be an easy task, it becomes extremely challenging if it has to be automated. However, an automated tool is needed… 

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