Corpus ID: 18896237

Circular arguments, begging the question and the formalization of argument strength

@inproceedings{Hahn2005CircularAB,
  title={Circular arguments, begging the question and the formalization of argument strength},
  author={U. Hahn and M. Oaksford and N. Corner},
  year={2005}
}
Recently Oaksford and Hahn (2004) proposed a Bayesian reconstruction of a classic argumentation fallacy - Locke’s ‘argument from ignorance.’ Here this account is extended to what is probably the most well-known of all argumen- tation fallacies: circular reasoning or ‘begging the ques- tion’. A Bayesian analysis is shown to clarify when and where circular reasoning is good or bad, and how seem- ing paradoxes about circular reasoning from the informal reasoning literature can be resolved… Expand
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