Circuit Fingerprinting Attacks: Passive Deanonymization of Tor Hidden Services

@inproceedings{Kwon2015CircuitFA,
  title={Circuit Fingerprinting Attacks: Passive Deanonymization of Tor Hidden Services},
  author={Albert Kwon and Mashael AlSabah and David Lazar and Marc Dacier and Srinivas Devadas},
  booktitle={USENIX Security Symposium},
  year={2015}
}
This paper sheds light on crucial weaknesses in the design of hidden services that allow us to break the anonymity of hidden service clients and operators passively. In particular, we show that the circuits, paths established through the Tor network, used to communicate with hidden services exhibit a very different behavior compared to a general circuit. We propose two attacks, under two slightly different threat models, that could identify a hidden service client or operator using these… CONTINUE READING
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Tor security advisory: “relay early

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