Choosing the Form of Government: Theory and Evidence from Brazil

  title={Choosing the Form of Government: Theory and Evidence from Brazil},
  author={Marcos Yamada Nakaguma},
  journal={Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal},
  • M. Y. Nakaguma
  • Published 1 December 2015
  • Political Science
  • Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal
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